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 1 
Introduction  
The whole of human history is a story of migration. Before there were borders, checkpoints 
or passports, human beings fled disaster, violence and ruin. The year 2015 tells this intrin-
sically human story and of the crushing desperation behind a dangerous sea crossing. It 
tells of those drowned en route from North Africa and the Middle East to Europe, and of 
those surviving and dying under barrel bombs in Syria, airstrikes in Yemen, sectarian vio-
lence in Iraq and suicide bombings in Lebanon and France. The year 2015 tells of those left 
adrift and starving on fishing boats in the Andaman Sea, of those shelled in Ukraine and of 
the quiet rumblings of an impending, preventable slaughter in Burundi. It tells of the largest 
refugee crisis since the end of the Second World War and of an international system crack-
ing under the weight of xenophobia and fear. 
How to protect those fleeing the horrors of war is as pertinent a question in the year 
2015 as it was in the aftermath of World War II. In the field of international law, a growing 
body of scholarship asks whether further collaboration between different legal regimes of-
fers a way forward. The recent anthology, Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and 
International Humanitarian Law,1 addresses the plight of those fleeing armed conflict – 
‘war refugees’ – and their place in a system that provides them with woefully inadequate 
protection. The collection presents the work of leading academics who interrogate the pos-
sible role of international humanitarian law (IHL) in alleviating the protection ‘gaps’2 in the 
international refugee regime.  
One particular line of thinking asks how IHL as the lex specialis of international 
human rights law in times of armed conflict – a relatively new way of framing the relation-
ship between these regimes – relates to the assessment of refugee claims arising in the con-
text of war. This thesis considers this question as it applies to refugee status determination 
in the specific context of Canada, a country that has ratified the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Canadian discussion about the proper 
                                                
 
1 David James Cantor and Jean-Francois Durieux, Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International 
Humanitarian Law (2014). 
2 Id. See generally Refuge from Inhumanity? Canvassing the Issues. 
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approach to these claims occurred during the early 1990s and was ostensibly resolved by 
the 1996 Guidelines on Civilian Non-Combatants Fearing Persecution in Civil War Situa-
tions. However, subsequent developments at the international level – namely, the further 
clarification of the relationship between IHRL and IHL by the International Court of Jus-
tice – suggest this issue is ripe for review.  
This thesis accepts the argument advanced by Hugo Storey3 and others that IHL as 
lex specialis is indeed relevant to the analysis of who is and who is not a Convention refu-
gee and does not engage with the broader academic debate surrounding this premise. Ra-
ther, this thesis is concerned with the how of the matter and thus attempts to identify and 
delimit the situations in which reference to IHL as lex specialis would accord with domes-
tic and international law.  
Research  Question  
Given how Canadian courts have interpreted the core elements of the Convention refugee 
definition and given the relevant interactions of IRL, IHRL and IHL at international law, 
when would reference to IHL as lex specialis by refugee decision-makers be appropriate? 
Methodology  &  Structure  
The thesis proceeds in four parts. Chapter 1 discusses the interactions of international refu-
gee law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law as they relate to 
the central question of this thesis. Specifically, this section explains the influence of IHRL 
on the interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and then considers the relationship 
between IHRL and IHL, with a particular focus on the principle of lex specialis. Chapter 2 
highlights the refugee definition contained in the 1951 Convention and explains how Cana-
dian courts have interpreted its core elements. This section also provides a brief overview 
of the Canadian refugee system.   
 Chapter 3 discusses how persons fleeing armed conflict are treated under the 1951 
Convention and outlines the early doctrinal debate in Canadian case law over the proper 
                                                
 
3 Hugo Storey, The ‘War Flaw’ and Why it Matters, in Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (David James Cantor & Jean-Francois Durieux, eds., 2014). 
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approach to such claims. As well, this section examines the Canadian Guidelines on Civil-
ian Non-Combatants Fearing Persecution in Civil War Situations, which were issued in 
1996 to aid refugee decision-makers. Finally, Chapter 4 draws upon academic commentary 
and Canadian jurisprudence to identify the situations in which reference to IHL as lex spe-
cialis by Canadian decision-makers would be appropriate. 
Chapter  1    
Regime  Interactions  in  International  Law:  IRL,  IHRL,  IHL  
In the eyes of A.A. Cançado Trindade, international human rights law, international refu-
gee law and international humanitarian law comprise “the three regimes of protection of the 
human person.”4 They are all founded upon basic considerations of humanity:5 IHRL pro-
tects the rights and freedoms of the individual vis-à-vis the State, IRL offers surrogate pro-
tection when the State fails to meet this responsibility and IHL sets forth a code of conduct 
to safeguard the humanity of combatants and civilians in times of war. These three regimes 
are not sequestered in silos, but interact habitually as complementary bodies of law, albeit 
with crucial points of divergence.6 
Apart from customary rules of international law, the sources of IHRL, IRL and IHL 
consist primarily of instruments developed and adopted by the international community in 
the twentieth century. Collectively known as the International Bill of Rights, the 1948 Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) form the basis of contemporary IHRL and operate as a nor-
mative springboard for later international and regional human rights instruments.7 The 
                                                
 
4 A.A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium 511 (2010) [here-
inafter Cançado Trindade]. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 512. 
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) 
[hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); entered into force March 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR]; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 993 
U.N.T.S. 3, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
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1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 1967 Proto-
col are the chief international refugee law treaties,8 supplemented at the regional level by 
the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
(OAU Convention), the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Cartagena Declaration) and 
the European Union Qualification Directive.9 With respect to the law of armed conflict, the 
modern rules of IHL are codified in the 1907 Hague Regulations, the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.10 
The premise buttressing this thesis is that IHL as lex specialis is relevant to the 
analysis of refugee claims arising in the context of armed conflict. Chapter 1 discusses the 
regime interactions in international law that underpin this logic.  The first section of this 
Chapter explains the relationship of international human rights law to the international ref-
ugee regime, specifically to the interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The second 
section of this Chapter discusses the historical and contemporary understandings of the 
relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law, 
with a particular emphasis on the principle of lex specialis. 
 
                                                
 
8 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; entered into force April 22, 1954 
[hereinafter 1951 Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; entered 
into force October 4, 1967 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. 
9 Organization of African Unity (now African Union) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, Sept. 10, 
1969; entered into force June 20, 1974 [hereinafter OAU Convention]; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 
1984, adopted by the Colloquium of the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and 
Panama [hereinafter Cartagena Declaration]; Council Directive 2004/83/E.C. of April 29 2004 on Minimum 
Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as 
Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, adopted by 
the Council of the European Union, September 30, 2004 [hereinafter EU Qualification Directive]. 
10 The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1907, U.K.T.S. 6 (1971) Cmnd, 
4575/1 Bevans 577/2 Am. J. Int’l L. Supp. 43 (1908); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 
GC-I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC-II]; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment to Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC-III]; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC-IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (June 8, 
1977) [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (June 8, 
1977) [hereinafter AP II]. 
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1.1.   The  Relationship  of  International  Human  Rights  Law  to  International  
Refugee  Law  
International refugee law and international human rights law both trace their modern ori-
gins to the aftermath of the Second World War. The flourishing of these legal regimes in 
the postwar period helped to facilitate the shift from a state-centric international system 
towards what Cançado Trindade considers the precious legacy of twentieth century, the rise 
of the individual as a subject of international law.11 Given their concomitant development 
and shared humanitarian purpose, it is unsurprising that there is substantial cross-
referencing between IRL and IHRL. The express reference to the 1948 Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights in the preamble to the 1951 Convention affirms this nexus, as does 
the frequency with which contemporary refugee law jurisprudence refers to international 
human rights instruments.12 
Treaty interpretation in international law is a complex process guided by the princi-
ples articulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and international 
jurisprudence, among other sources. According to Article 31 of the VCLT, “[a] treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”13 The good 
faith requirement – also known as pacta sunt servanda – is the key principle buttressing the 
provision. Article 31(2) provides that the sources of a treaty’s context include its text, pre-
amble and annexes.  
 The preamble of the 1951 Convention refers to “the principle that human beings 
shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination” and the endeavor by 
the UN to “assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and 
freedoms.”14 In accordance with Article 31 of the VCLT, the strong human rights lan-
                                                
 
11 Cançado Trindade, supra note 4 at 213. 
12 See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Dynamic of International Refugee Law, 25(4) Int’l J. Ref. L. 651, 661 
(2014) who notes that courts are increasingly using accepted interpretations of fundamental rights to identify 
“the characteristics of rights and the elements central to human dignity that no one should be expected or 
required to change.”  
13 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (May 23, 1969) Art. 31 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
14 1951 Convention, supra note 8 at preamble. 
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guage15 in the Convention’s preamble suggests that a proper interpretation of the treaty’s 
provisions is one contextualized by international human rights law. By consciously includ-
ing these broad commitments to human rights and by specifically invoking the UN Charter 
and UDHR in the treaty’s preamble, the drafters of the 1951 Convention tethered interna-
tional human rights law to the refugee regime at its inception.  
 Despite this early connection, IHRL was in its infancy at the time of the Conven-
tion’s adoption and thus its interpretive influence was limited. As the modern international 
human rights system evolved, however, the relationship between the two regimes was in-
creasingly subjected to academic scrutiny. In his 1991 pivotal work, The Law of Refugee 
Status, James Hathaway pioneered a human rights approach to the Convention refugee def-
inition contained in Article 1 of the treaty.16 Chapter 2 of this thesis considers the refugee 
definition in detail, elucidating the human rights standards that inform its core components. 
It is important to note, however, that Hathaway’s work in this regard has been adopted in 
jurisprudence across the common law world. His conceptualization of persecution as “the 
sustained or systemic denial of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state pro-
tection”17 finds widespread support and is endorsed by UNHCR.18 Thus, the notion that 
international human rights law informs core refugee law concepts is largely uncontroversial 
in international law today. 
1.2.   The  Relationship  Between  International  Human  Rights  Law  and              
International  Humanitarian  Law  
1.21     Historically  
International human rights law and international humanitarian law were traditionally un-
derstood as separate, mutually-exclusive regimes. IHRL governed in peacetime and IHL 
applied during war. The two bodies of law were thus conceived as alternatives to one an-
                                                
 
15 See UNHCR, The International Protection of Refugees: Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees (April 2001) paras 2-5 [hereinafter UNHCR, Article 1]. 
16 James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (1991) [hereinafter Hathaway 1991]. 
17 Id. 101.  
18 See generally UNHCR, Article 1, supra note 15. 
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other, a view reinforced by a number of notable differences between them.19 For instance, 
IHRL obliges States to respect, protect and fulfill human rights, whereas IHL obligations 
bind belligerents in armed conflict, including non-state actors. In IHRL, the individual has 
the right to petition a court or other body in order to seek redress for violations of the law, a 
feature unknown to the humanitarian regime. The two bodies of law also developed along 
distinct historical trajectories, with IHRL’s emergence from the ashes of the Holocaust 
standing in contrast to IHL’s substantial development during the nineteenth century. 
The ‘silos’ approach to these two legal regimes began to break down during the late 
1960s as international human rights law blossomed and the notion that IHRL ought to ap-
ply in conflict situations began to gain traction. In 1966, for instance, the ICCPR and 
ICESCR distinguished between derogable and non-derogable rights. The treaties’ acknowl-
edgment “that certain human rights could be curtailed in armed conflict”20 implicitly meant 
that others could not be similarly circumscribed. Regional human rights instruments adopt-
ed similar provisions.21 A spate of bloody international and civil conflicts dotting the globe 
during this era also encouraged questions about human rights in wartime.22 In 1968 the UN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution titled, “Human Rights in Armed Conflict,”23 and 
later, in 1977, the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions expanded protections 
for civilians in war, including in conflicts of a non-international nature. While some read 
these developments as part of the ‘humanization’ of IHL,24 those with a more traditionalist 
perspective thought them almost heretical. Draper, for instance, wrote,  
The attempt to confuse the two regimes of law is insupportable in theory and 
inadequate in practice. The two regimes are not only distinct but are diametri-
                                                
 
19 See, for instance, Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection and 
International Humanitarian Law, 86 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 856 (2004) 789; Noëlle Quénivet, Introduction. 
The History of the Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law (Roberta 
Arnold & Noëlle Quénivet, eds., 2008) 2-3 [hereinafter Quénivet]. 
20 Quénivet, id. 4. 
21 Id. 
22 These conflicts include the wars in Vietnam and Nigeria, as well as the Israeli occupation of Arab territo-
ries. See Quénivet, who cites Keith Suter, Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, XV Military Law and Law of 
War Review 400 (1976) 395.  
23 “Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts,” GA Res. 2444 (XXIII), December 19, 1968.  
24 See generally, Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law (2006). 
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cally opposed… At the end of the day, the law of human rights seeks to reflect 
the cohesion and harmony in human society and must, from the nature of 
things, be a different and opposed law to that which seeks to regulate the con-
duct of hostile relationships between states or other organized armed groups, 
and in internal rebellions. The humanitarian nature of the modern law of war 
neither justifies the confusion with, nor dispels the opposition to, human 
rights.25 
The nature of the relationship between IHRL and IHL is the subject of ongoing debate well 
into the twenty-first century. Most scholars have long since abandoned the conventional 
approach as espoused by Draper, although this view still lingers at the periphery. Instead, 
the contemporary discussion centers on the principles of complementarity and lex specialis, 
which are taken up in the following section. 
1.22     Complementarity  and  Lex  Specialis  
State practice today affirms the applicability of human rights in armed conflict,26 and both 
the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN Human Rights Committee27 sup-
port this position. Contemporary scholarship explains the relationship between IHRL and 
IHL in this context with reference to the principles of complementarity and lex specialis. 
The theory of complementarity holds that IHRL and IHL are distinct but mutually-
reinforcing regimes, a sentiment best captured by Calogeropoulos-Stratis who writes, “[t]he 
two laws are two crutches on which the individual may lean to avoid – insofar as possible – 
the disastrous consequences of armed conflict.”28 The utility of this theory is limited, how-
ever, in that it is only an adequate explanation of the relationship between IHRL and IHL to 
the extent that the two bodies of law do not conflict. When the IHRL norms governing a 
                                                
 
25 G.I.A.D. Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Acta Juridica 193, 205 (1979), cited by Quénivet, 
supra note 19 at 6.  
26 See generally Ilia Siatitsa & Maia Titberidze, Human Rights in Armed Conflict from the Perspective of the 
Contemporary State Practice in the United Nations: Factual Answers to Certain Hypothetical Challenges, 
ADH Research Paper (2011). 
27 See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of 
Emergency, (August 31, 2001) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 
No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, (May 26, 
2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13. 
 
28 See translation in John Quigley, The Relation Between Human Rights Law and the Law of Belligerent Oc-
cupation: Does an Occupied Population have a Right to Freedom of Assembly and Expression? Boston Col-
lege Int’l and Com. L. Rev. 12 (1989) 8. 
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given situation are inconsistent with the applicable humanitarian law rules, courts must 
seek out an alternate explanation of their relationship in order to resolve the normative con-
flict.  
When a subject matter is governed by both a general standard and a specific rule, the 
specific rule prevails. This maxim, known as lex specialis, is a widely accepted principle of 
legal interpretation.29 The more specific rule takes precedence over a conflicting general 
one in order to “give effect to the intentions of the parties and to take into account the par-
ticularities of the case.”30 This rationale is premised on the idea that those crafting legisla-
tion or treaties could not have intended to give effect to two equal yet conflicting norms. 
Thus, lex specialis has an arguably sturdier foundation in domestic orders with clearer legal 
and political hierarchies than in the international system, which lacks a central legislative 
body and where the relationship between separate bodies of law is murkier.31  
The lex specialis maxim has nonetheless been accepted as valid in international legal 
scholarship and jurisprudence. Most discussions of the principle trace its origins back to 
Roman law and routinely quote Grotius who in the 17th century wrote of his preference for 
the rule “which is most specific and approaches most nearly to the subject in hand.”32 Mi-
lanovic argues, however, that while the maxim has historical roots, the mainstream use of 
lex specialis in international legal thinking, particularly as it pertains to the relationship 
between IHRL and IHL, stretches only as far back as the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons33 decision 
in 1996. He writes,  
It is simply factually incorrect to say that lex specialis was always ‘there’ 
somewhere in the ether, that it represents the ‘traditional’ position that its alter-
natives have the burden of disproving, or that is entrenched in long-standing 
                                                
 
29 Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, International Law Commission, 58th Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 
(April 13, 2006) para 38 [hereinafter ICL Study]. 
30 Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 
77 Nordic J. Int’l L. 27 (2005) 36 [hereinafter Lindroos]. 
31 Id. 28. 
32 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis 428 (1625). Cited in the ILC Study at para 59. 
33 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, (July 8, 1996) 1996 ICJ 226 [herein-
after ICJ, Nuclear Weapons]. 
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custom.34  
Tasked with the momentous question of whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is 
permitted under international law, the ICJ’s 1996 advisory opinion considered the argu-
ment that such use would violate the right to life guaranteed in Article 6 of the ICCPR. The 
Court flatly rejected the proposition that international human rights protection ceases in 
times of war but recognized the normative conflict between the right to life under IHRL 
and the rules surrounding the unlawful loss of life in hostilities in IHL, the body of law 
governing armed conflict. The Court stated,  
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life also applies in 
hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then 
falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applica-
ble in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. 
Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in 
warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 
of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in 
armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.35 
The ICJ reaffirmed this stance in its 2004 advisory opinion Construction of a Wall36 when 
it considered the legal consequences arising from Israel’s constructed barrier in the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territory. Here, the Court mused further on the relationship between IHRL 
and IHL, declaring: 
[S]ome rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; 
others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be mat-
ters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the question 
put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of 
international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international 
humanitarian law.37  
 
                                                
 
34 Marko Milanovic, The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between Human Rights 
and International Humanitarian Law, in Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (Jens 
David Ohlin, ed., forthcoming), 23 available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463957 [hereinafter Mila-
novic]. 
35 ICJ, Nuclear Weapons, supra note 33 at para 25. 
36 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opin-
ion, (July 9, 2004) 2004 ICJ 131.  
37 Id. Para 106. 
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The two ICJ advisory opinions spurred numerous mentions of lex specialis in aca-
demia. However, despite the principle’s near-ubiquitous presence in literature about con-
flicts of sources and legal interpretation, Anja Lindroos astutely observes that there is scant 
exploration of the principle itself, either by scholars or in the jurisprudence of the interna-
tional courts applying the maxim. She argues, 
[Lex specialis] has been employed relatively rarely and rather mechanically by 
international tribunals, with no analysis of the maxim itself…it is hard to give a 
clear scope to lex specialis, and…international judicial bodies have generally 
used it in a rather loose fashion.38 
The International Law Commission spent a significant portion of its 2006 study on the 
fragmentation of international law addressing the function and scope of the principle. The 
study suggests that a true distillation of lex specialis and its potential applications is hin-
dered by the fact that any analysis invoking the maxim necessarily involves a set of highly 
contextual factors. The ILC describes lex specialis in the following terms:  
Its power is entirely dependent on the normative considerations for which it 
provides articulation: sensitivity to context, capacity to reflect State will, con-
creteness, clarity, definiteness. Its functioning cannot be assessed independently 
of the role of consideration of the latter type in specific context of legal reason-
ing.39  
 In his discussion about the current state of the debate over lex specialis in interna-
tional law, Milanovic formulates three possible conceptions of the principle: “as a rule of 
total displacement; as a rule of partial displacement or norm conflict resolution; and as a 
mere interpretative tool or rule of norm conflict avoidance.”40 The notion that lex specialis 
operates in the first manner described, as a rule of total displacement, finds little support in 
international law today. Such an understanding “is essentially a restatement…of the classi-
cal divide between the law of war and the law of peace.”41 Commenting on the Nuclear 
Weapons case, the ILC affirmed that the invocation of IHL by way of lex specialis did not 
operate to displace IHRL: 
                                                
 
38 Lindroos, supra note 30 at 48. 
39 ILC Study, supra note 29 at para 119. 
40 Milanovic, supra note 34 at 24. 
41 Id. 
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The Court was careful to point out that human rights law continued to apply 
within armed conflict. The exception – humanitarian law – only affected one 
(albeit important) aspect of it, namely the relative assessment of ‘arbitrari-
ness.’42 
Milanovic’s second and third conceptions of lex specialis mirror the understanding of the 
principle presented in the ILC Study. The second variant, where the maxim operates as a 
conflict-resolution technique, covers the situation in which two legal provisions “are both 
valid and applicable, are in no express hierarchical relationship, and provide incompatible 
direction on how to deal with the same facts.”43 In this scenario, the normative conflict 
cannot be resolved through interpretation and one must apply the more specific rule to ar-
rive at a legal conclusion. For instance, 
The two cases in which such norm conflicts would arise most frequently would 
be killing and detention. If such conflict was unavoidable lex specialis would 
operate as a rule of norm conflict resolution, so that IHL would displace or 
qualify the conflicting rule of IHRL to the extent strictly required to resolve the 
conflict. Thus, a killing that would in principle violate IHRL…but was compli-
ant with the rules of IHL…would now also become compliant with IHRL by 
virtue of lex specialis.44 
The final conception of lex specialis is that the principle is an interpretative tool. Here, “the 
specific rule should be read and understood within the confines or against the background 
of the general standard.”45 Accordingly, when a situation is regulated by an IHRL and IHL 
norm, the latter of which is more specific, “IHL would need to be taken into account, 
but…it would not necessarily be dispositive for the interpretation of IHRL.”46 Thus, IHL 
would not outright overrule a human rights norm merely because its applicability is trig-
gered by the presence of armed conflict.  
The distinction between these second and third variants of the lex specialis maxim 
is not immediately obvious, but is conceptually significant. Whereas the second variant 
operates to displace the IHRL norm in favour of the corresponding IHL norm in order to 
                                                
 
42 ILC Study, supra note 29 at para 104. 
43 Id. Para 57. 
44 Milanovic, supra note 34 at 17. 
45 ILC Study, supra note 29 at 56. 
46 Milanovic, supra note 34 at 28. 
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resolve the conflict between the two, the third variant draws upon the appropriate IHL rule 
in order to inform the interpretation of a human rights provision if the condition of armed 
conflict is met. This latter understanding of the maxim is a relatively benign statement of 
the principle and conforms with the standard rules of legal interpretation. Accordingly, the 
notion that IHL as lex specialis provides interpretative guidance to IHRL as lex generalis in 
times of armed conflict is largely uncontroversial.   
The second, narrower variant in which lex specialis is a conflict-resolution tech-
nique is posited as theoretically valid in the ILC Study, but notably finds little doctrinal 
support.47 The limited jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals applying IHL as 
lex specialis do so as a means of obtaining interpretive guidance.48 Beginning in the late 
1990s, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights sustained a lengthy doctrinal debate over the appropriate use of IHL in their 
human rights decisions.49 In its early cases, the Inter-American Commission “invoked the 
direct application of IHL, and found that it [the Commission] was competent to determine 
violations thereof.”50 This approach was roundly rejected by the Inter-American Court, 
which maintained that the system’s constitutive document – the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR) – only enabled the judicial bodies “to determine whether the acts 
or norms of the States are compatible with the ACHR,”51 not assess violations of humani-
tarian law. However, the Court did acknowledge “that IHL may and should be utilized as 
an interpretive reference of human rights norms during times of conflict.”52 The Commis-
sion has since adopted the Court’s position thereby alleviating the jurisprudential schism. 
Tabak describes the significance of this approach in the following terms: 
[W]hen these judicial organs consult IHL as an interpretive reference, they do 
so not to find countries in violation of IHL, but instead, seek to use IHL in or-
                                                
 
47 Id. At 32-34 Milanovic comments that the ILC provides no examples of this variant in jurisprudence. 
48 This is how Milanovic understands the operation of lex specialis in the Nuclear Weapons case.  
49 Shana Tabak traces these cases in Armed Conflict and the Inter-American Human Rights System: Applica-
tion or Interpretation of International Humanitarian Law? in Applying International Humanitarian Law in 
Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies (Derek Jinks et al, eds., 2014). 
50 Id. 233. 
51 Id. Citing the Las Palmeras Case.  
52 Id. 
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der to bring greater precision to their holdings on violations of international 
HRL within the context of armed conflict or occupation.53 
Given the above discussion, this thesis adopts the interpretive variant of IHL as lex special-
is, as it is the only conceptualization of this principle that finds broad support in interna-
tional law today. Accordingly, IHL is understood as an interpretive tool to contextualize 
human rights standards and does not operate to displace or overrule IHRL norms. 
Chapter  2     
The  Refugee  Defined  
2.1   The  Convention  Refugee  and  Regional  Definitions  
Although commonly used to describe anyone fleeing perilous conditions in their home 
country, ‘refugee’ is ultimately a term of art.54 Certain legal criteria must be satisfied be-
fore a person is declared a refugee under international law. The widely-ratified 1951 Con-
vention and its 1967 Protocol specify these criteria and establish the framework for deter-
mining if one qualifies for refugee status. The UNHCR Handbook, first published in 1979, 
provides governments, judges and other decision-makers with guidance on the refugee sta-
tus determination process. Drawing upon State practice, jurisprudence and academic litera-
ture, the Handbook helps alleviate disparities in interpretation between jurisdictions.55  
 The 1951 Convention was drafted in response to Europe’s postwar refugee crisis 
and the initial text reflected an era-specific understanding of ‘refugee.’ The Convention 
originally imposed a temporal limitation on the refugee definition so that only those who 
became refugees “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951” were covered by 
the treaty. State parties also had the option of restricting their obligations under the Con-
vention to European refugees.56 Both the temporal and geographic limitations were re-
                                                
 
53 Id. 253. 
54 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law 15 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter 
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam]. 
55 UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (reissued 
2011) [hereinafter Handbook]. 
56 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 54 at 36. 
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moved by the 1967 Protocol and today, Article 1A(2) of the Convention defines a refugee 
as a person who,    
owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationali-
ty, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country.57 
The Convention refugee definition serves as a jumping-off point for the expanded refugee 
definitions found in regional instruments. For contrast purposes, the African and Latin 
American definitions are discussed briefly here.  
The Organization of African Unity (now African Union) adopted the first regional 
refugee instrument in 1969. While the 1951 Convention formed against the backdrop of 
World War II, a very different set of political realities influenced the drafters at the African 
level. The OAU Convention emerged during a period of bloody civil war, apartheid and 
anti-colonial liberation struggles.58 In response to these conflicts, Article 1(2) of the Afri-
can instrument expanded the refugee definition beyond the 1951 Convention to encompass 
“every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order…is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in 
order to seek refuge.”59 The expanded definition is considered one of the most notable 
achievements of the OAU Convention as it confers refugee status to those fleeing armed 
conflict and other situations of violence – ie, those who fall outside the 1951 Convention 
framework. While this broader definition is legally significant, the practical implementa-
tion of this protection framework has been less remarkable. As Abass and Mystris point 
out, “concerns remain over the lack of commentary on the determination of refugee status, 
which is left solely to the States’ discretion.”60 
                                                
 
57 1951 Convention, supra note 8 at Art. 1A(2). 
58 Ademola Abass & Dominique Mystris, The African Union Legal Framework for Protecting Asylum Seek-
ers, in Regional Approaches to the Protection of Asylum Seekers: An International Legal Perspective (Ade-
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Refugee Problems in Africa, 20 Ref. Survey Quarterly (2001) 112. 
59 OAU Convention, supra note 9 at Article 1(2). 
60 Abass & Mystris, supra note 58 at 23.
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Faced with their own regional refugee crisis, Latin American countries adopted the 
Cartagena Declaration in 1984. Inspired by the OAU Convention adopted some years earli-
er, the Declaration expanded the refugee definition beyond the 1951 Convention to include 
“persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been 
threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation 
of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”61 
Although the Declaration is non-binding, many countries in the region have adopted this 
definition into their national legislation. Furthermore, the core asylum principles are rein-
forced by the Inter-American system of human rights protection.62 
2.2   The  Refugee  in  Canadian  Law  
2.21   Legislative  Background  &  The  Refugee  Determination  System  
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) is the primary legislation governing 
immigration and refugee protection in Canada.63 The Act confers refugee protection upon 
Convention refugees and ‘persons in need of protection.’ The latter category refers to those 
in danger of torture or cruel and unusual treatment in their home country.64 Such persons 
fall under section 97 of IRPA and are afforded the same rights as Convention refugees – 
namely, the right to non-refoulement and the right to seek permanent residency in Cana-
da.65 Section 96 of IRPA covers Convention refugees and imports Article 1A(2) of the 
1951 Convention into Canadian law.66 Given the substantial judicial engagement with the 
Convention refugee definition since its first appearance in 1970s immigration legislation, 
Canadian federal courts have frequently been the bearers of key developments in interna-
tional refugee law.  
                                                
 
61 Cartagena Declaration, supra note 9. 
62 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 54 at 40. 
63 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001 c. 27 [hereinafter IRPA]. 
64 Id. S. 97. 
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66 IRPA, supra note 63 at S. 96. 
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The administrative authority tasked with inland refugee status determination is the 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), specifically the Refugee Protection Di-
vision (RPD). Those seeking refugee status in Canada may make a claim at a port of entry 
upon arrival at the border or else at an inland office.67 Eligible claims are referred to the 
RPD for a hearing. Claimants receiving negative decisions may seek appeal at the recently-
enacted Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). The Canadian Parliament stalled the establish-
ment of the RAD until 2012 although it had been provided for in IRPA since 2001. Prior to 
the RAD’s enactment, rejected refugee applicants could only seek judicial review of their 
cases at the Federal Court, which was rarely granted.68 
2.22   The  Human  Rights  Approach  to  Refugee  Status  Determination  in  Canada  
Canadian jurisprudence affirms the human rights approach as the proper approach to the 
interpretation of section 96 of IRPA. This approach applies to each of the core elements of 
the Convention refugee definition.69 The present discussion explores these core elements 
and their treatment by Canadian courts in order to understand how IRB decision-makers 
determine whether or not a refugee claimant satisfies the relevant legal criteria. The criteria 
are discussed in the following order: well-founded fear, persecution, nexus of persecution 
to the Convention grounds, availability of state protection and internal flight alternative. 
The part of the refugee status determination process that engages with these criteria is re-
ferred to as ‘inclusion’ – as in, it is the stage in which national decision-makers assess 
whether a claimant may be included as a Convention refugee. Exclusion is not taken up in 
this thesis.  
  
                                                
 
67 See ‘Claimant’s Guide’ on IRB Website, supra note 65.  
68 Estimates suggest only 7 per cent of applications for leave to appeal were granted under the old system of 
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29. See FN 9 for a brief list of relevant cases on this point.  
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Well-­Founded  Fear  
A refugee must possess a well-founded fear of persecution in her country of origin or na-
tionality. According to the UNHCR Handbook, this requirement involves both a subjective 
and an objective assessment: the claimant must subjectively experience fear and this fear 
must have a basis in reality.70 Most countries in the common law world have adopted the 
Handbook’s approach.71 In Ward, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted this bipartite 
test.72  
A number of Canadian cases address the standard of proof a claimant is required to 
meet in order to establish that her fear is well-founded.73 In Adjei,74 the Federal Court of 
Appeal allowed an appeal from an applicant whose claim was rejected after the IRB mis-
applied the standard of proof. Adjei, a Ghanian, brought an application for refugee status 
on the basis of persecution for his political and economic activism. The IRB found he was 
not a Convention refugee on the basis that he had not established that his fear of persecu-
tion in Ghana was well-founded. In reversing, the Court observed,  
[T]he objective test is not so stringent as to require a probability of persecution. 
In other words, although an applicant has to establish his case on a balance of 
probabilities, he does not nevertheless have to prove that persecution would be 
more likely than not.75  
The ruling in Ponniah further elucidated the proper standard of proof.76 Ponniah was 
a Sri Lankan Tamil who experienced unlawful arrest and torture at the hands of the Indian 
Peace Keeping Force and non-state rebel groups in his home country. The IRB rejected his 
claim predominantly on credibility grounds but, like in Adjei, had also misapplied the 
standard of proof when it came to assessing the objective basis of fear. In reviewing the 
Board’s decision, the Court clarified that the appropriate standard is “a ‘reasonable’ or even 
                                                
 
70 Handbook, supra note 55 at para 38. 
71 James Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (2d ed. 2014) 91 [hereinafter Hathaway & 
Foster]. 
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nition in the Case Law (2010) Chapter 5 [hereinafter IRB Interpretation]. 
74 Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989) 2 F.C. 680 (C.A.). 
75 Id. Para 5. 
76 Ponniah v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991) F.C.J. No. 359. 
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a ‘serious possibility’” of persecution. This standard “is less than a 50% chance…but more 
than a minimal or mere possibility.”77 
The question of how a claimant’s delay – whether in fleeing persecution or in making 
a refugee claim – affects the assessment of her subjective fear is a frequent discussion in 
Canadian jurisprudence. The IRB notes that the Federal Court’s decision in Huerta is a par-
ticularly crucial ruling on this point,78 as it stipulates the general rule that  
although the presence of delay does not mandate the rejection of a claim as the 
claimant may have a reasonable explanation for the delay, nonetheless, delay 
may, in the right circumstances, constitute sufficient grounds upon which to re-
ject a claim.79 
In many cases a delay in leaving one’s country or a delay in claiming refugee status once in 
Canada will negate the subjective fear requirement of the Convention refugee definition, 
causing the claim to fail. However, the law requires a thorough examination of each situa-
tion given the highly contextual nature of each case.80   
Persecution  
Persecution is not defined in the Convention and has no universally-accepted definition. 
The UNHCR Handbook provides little guidance on the issue apart from its statement that 
threats to life and freedom constitute persecution, as do “other serious violations of human 
rights.”81 As mentioned in Chapter 1, Hathaway conceives persecution as “the sustained or 
systemic denial of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection.”82 This 
conceptualization contains two aspects: serious harm and the failure of the state to protect 
the individual from said harm. Recourse to IHRL is necessary to their interpretation in or-
der to provide decision-makers with objective standards to evaluate the seriousness of the 
harm facing the individual and the availability of state protection in the circumstances. As 
Hathaway and Foster explain, 
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78 IRB Interpretation, supra note 73 at Chapter 5.4. 
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International human rights standards are rather uniquely suited to the task of 
defining which risks involve unacceptable forms of serious harm in a manner 
that offers not only consistency, but also normative legitimacy – these being 
precisely the standards that states themselves have established to define imper-
missibly serious harms.83 
The interpretation of ‘persecution’ has proven to be one of the most inconsistent areas of 
refugee law jurisprudence. However, Hathaway and Foster argue that, despite variance in 
some jurisdictions, the human rights approach is now the prevailing approach in the com-
mon law world, and is gaining similar momentum in civil law countries.84  
 Canadian law has adopted the human rights approach and characterizes perse-
cution as ‘serious and persistent harm.’ 85 The mistreatment feared by the refugee 
claimant must encroach upon human dignity in a way that threatens a core human 
right; this is what is meant by the ‘serious’ requirement. The notion that persecution 
involves a persistent pattern of harm finds support in a number of decisions, includ-
ing the frequently cited case of Rajudeen.86 Rajudeen, a Sri Lankan, sought refugee 
status in Canada on the basis of religious and racial persecution. As a minority Mus-
lim Tamil, he faced harassment and abuse from members of the ethnic and religious 
majority, including beatings and threats to his life. In reversing the IRB’s denial of 
his claim, the Federal Court of Appeal found that Rajudeen had sustained “a lengthy 
period of systematic infliction of threats and of personal injury”87 and that such 
treatment fell within the meaning of ‘persecution.’ The Court relied upon definitions 
of persecution which emphasize repeated exposure to harm in reaching its conclusion 
on this issue.88 
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 While the persistence of harm is critical to the notion of persecution, a lack of repe-
tition in itself is not determinative. In Ranjha,89 for instance, the Court cautioned against 
“an exaggerated emphasis on the need for repetition and persistence,”90 finding that the 
IRB had failed to properly consider the quality of the harmful acts facing the claimant. 
Ranjha, a Pakistani political activist, had been tortured by police in the aftermath a political 
protest and on a separate occasion had sustained an arm fracture by the same assailants. 
While the IRB found these incidents were not systematic enough to amount to persecution, 
the Court held the proper assessment in this case was to consider whether the incidents 
were “serious enough as to constitute a fundamental violation of the applicant’s human 
dignity.”91  
 A single incident of discrimination or harassment is not typically considered perse-
cution. Although this point is made repeatedly throughout the jurisprudence, even early 
cases acknowledged the distinction is not always easy to draw. In Sagharichi, for instance, 
the Court noted,  
[T]he dividing line between persecution and discrimination or harassment is 
difficult to establish…the identification of persecution behind incidents of dis-
crimination or harassment is not purely a question of fact but a mixed question 
of law and fact, legal concepts being involved.92 
The contemporary position holds that instances of discrimination that do not in themselves 
rise to the level of persecution may cumulatively amount to persecution. The Handbook 
affirms this view, advising that discrimination may result in consequences of “a substantial-
ly prejudicial nature for the person concerned, e.g. serious restrictions on his right to earn 
his livelihood, his right to practise his religion, or his access to normally available educa-
tional facilities.”93 
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 The IRB offers a non-exhaustive list of examples of persecution drawn from Cana-
dian jurisprudence.94 Physical abuse, torture and rape categorically constitute persecution 
as do other attacks on bodily autonomy, such as forced abortion, sterilization and female 
circumcision. Persecution need not be physical in nature, however, as serious economic and 
educational deprivations may also come within the term’s meaning. As well, numerous 
cases address the question of when prosecution constitutes persecution.95 
Nexus  of  Persecution  to  a  Convention  Ground  
The Convention refugee definition in Article 1A(2) enumerates five grounds of persecu-
tion. A person seeking refugee status must demonstrate that her well-founded fear of perse-
cution is for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion. If a refugee claimant is unable to establish a nexus between the harm 
feared and one or more of these categories, the claim will not succeed.96 Essentially, the 
law requires a connection between “who the claimant is or what she believes and the risk of 
being persecuted in her home state.”97 
From Hathaway’s vantage point, the Convention grounds represent “fundamental 
socio-political disfranchisement defined by reference to core norms of non-discrimination 
law.”98 The principle of non-discrimination underpinning these categories not only “identi-
fies those potential human rights victims who are fundamentally marginalized in their state 
of origin”99 but, by doing so, provides a means of distinguishing these claims from those 
arising out of a general risk of serious harm.100 The Supreme Court of Canada held as much 
in Ward when it noted that the drafters of the 1951 Convention “did not intend to offer a 
haven for all suffering individuals.”101  
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When assessing a refugee claim, the RPD is required to consider not only the 
grounds raised by the applicant in her case, but all of grounds listed in the Convention ref-
ugee definition. If the RPD finds a nexus between the harm feared and one ground “it is not 
necessary to go on to consider all of the other grounds.”102 Furthermore, when determining 
whether persecution is “for reasons of” a Convention ground, “the relevant consideration is 
the perception of the persecutor,”103 not whether the claimant in reality is a member of a 
certain race or holds a particular set of beliefs, for instance. The nexus between the harm 
feared and the ground is established even if the persecutor’s “motivation for the mistreat-
ment is mixed.”104  
For reasons of space, this thesis does not explore the contours of each Convention 
ground but does explain the Canadian approach to ‘membership of a particular social 
group,’ the ground that has historically been the most difficult for decision-makers to as-
sess. In Ward, the claimant was a member of the Irish National Liberation Army who fa-
cilitated the escape of several hostages upon learning they were going to be killed by other 
INLA members. He was punished by way of torture and death threats. He sought refugee 
status in Canada claiming he feared persecution on the basis of his membership in a partic-
ular social group. His claim was rejected on the basis that ILNA was not a social group 
within the meaning of the refugee definition and, in any event, his fear was not based on 
said membership but his actions taken as an individual.  
The Court held that ‘particular social group’ consists of three categories.105 First, it 
encompasses groups defined by an innate, unchangeable characteristic. Second, the term 
refers to groups whose members voluntarily associated for reasons so fundamental to their 
human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association. Third, ‘particular 
social group’ includes groups associated by a former voluntary status which is now unalter-
able due to its historical permanence. In Canadian jurisprudence, particular social group 
includes the family, unions, impoverished persons, LGBTQ individuals and women facing 
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domestic violence, among other groups depending on the unique circumstances of the 
case.106   
Availability  of  State  Protection  
In order to be declared a refugee, a person must be unable or unwilling to seek the protec-
tion of her country of origin or nationality. This core element of the Convention definition 
relates to the fundamental principle of surrogate protection underpinning the refugee re-
gime.107 Under international law, the State bears the primary responsibility for protecting 
the rights of its citizens and others in its territory. When the State persecutes its own citi-
zens or when it is unable to protect individuals from this harm, the persecuted person may 
avail herself of protection from the international community. As the Supreme Court of 
Canada noted in Ward, international protection “was meant to be a forum of second resort 
for the persecuted…approachable upon failure of local protection.”108 A person seeking 
such protection must be outside the country of her nationality, as international protection 
“cannot come into play as long as a person is within the territorial jurisdiction of [her] 
home country.”109 
Ward set out two presumptions that apply to the state protection analysis of a refu-
gee claim.110 The IRB advises that these presumptions are appropriately considered “at the 
stage of analysis when one is examining whether the claimant’s fear is well-founded.”111 
The first presumption is that, once the claimant has established a credible fear of persecu-
tion and that state protection is unavailable, persecution is presumed likely and the fear to 
be a well-founded one.112 The second presumption is that States are presumed capable of 
protecting their citizens, save for situations of complete state breakdown.113 A claimant 
may rebut the latter presumption by presenting “clear and convincing evidence” to the con-
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trary. This may be achieved by showing, for example, that other individuals in similar cir-
cumstances were unable to access protection114 or that the claimant herself previously tried 
and failed to obtain protection from the State.115 
Internal  Flight  Alternative  
The refugee definition contained in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention makes no men-
tion of the ‘internal flight alternative’ (IFA), although the Handbook notes that decision-
makers frequently consider this concept when assessing refugee status claims.116 IFA refers 
to “a specific area of the country where there is no risk of a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion and where, given the particular circumstances of the case, the individual could reason-
ably be expected to establish…herself and live a normal life.”117 Some jurisdictions tie this 
concept to the well-founded fear of persecution element of the definition while others link 
it conceptually to the requirement that a claimant be unwilling or unable to avail herself of 
protection from the state.118  
In the Canadian context, one of the most important decisions on the IFA is Rasa-
ratnam.119 Rasaratnam was a Sri Lankan Tamil fearing persecution from the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam. His claim was rejected by the IRB on the basis that Colombo, the 
capital city under the effective control of the Sri Lankan government, was an IFA. Uphold-
ing the Board’s decision, the Court made the following comments,  
[S]ince by definition a Convention refugee must be a refugee from a country, 
not from some subdivision or region of a country, a claimant cannot be a Con-
vention refugee if there is an IFA. It follows that the determination of whether 
or not there is an IFA is integral to the determination whether or not a claimant 
is a Convention refugee120…That said, however, a claimant is not to be ex-
pected to raise the question of an IFA nor is an allegation that none exists simp-
ly to be inferred from the claim itself. The question must be expressly raised at 
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the hearing by the refugee hearing officer or the Board and the claimant afford-
ed the opportunity to address it with evidence and argument.121 
The Rasaratnam holding, in conjunction with the later ruling in Thirunavukkarasu,122 estab-
lished a two-pronged test for Canadian decision-makers in approaching the question of 
whether a claimant has an IFA. First, the Board must be satisfied that there is no serious 
possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the part of the country the proposed IFA is 
located. Second, the conditions in the part of the country where the IFA is located “must be 
such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular 
to the claimant, for [her] to seek refuge there.”123 Subsequent cases have identified the fac-
tors decision-makers must take into account when determining whether an IFA would be 
unreasonable. Such factors include the claimant’s age, employability, access to education, 
health and family situations.124  
Chapter  3  
Refugee  Law  and  Persons  Fleeing  Violence  and  Conflict    
The Second World War left over thirty million refugees in its wake while the partition of 
Germany and the rise of the Soviet Union expelled thirteen million more across the Iron 
Curtain.125 The enormity of this postwar refugee crisis spurred a bold response from the 
international community in the creation of UNHCR in 1949 and the Refugee Convention in 
1951. The cause-and-effect relationship between post-WWII displacement and the creation 
of the modern refugee system thus implicitly entangles armed conflict and IRL. This nexus 
is obvious even in nascent refugee law developments, such as the attempt by the League of 
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Nations to protect Russians fleeing the conflict in their homeland during the early 1920s.126 
Violence has always fuelled flight.   
It is somewhat ironic, then – or perhaps entirely unsurprising given the perennial 
anxiety over State sovereignty in international law – that a system so historically entwined 
with this moment of unprecedented bloodshed and humanitarian catastrophe is hostile to 
the general protection of civilians from war. This was true even at its inception: the original 
temporal and geographic limitations on the Convention refugee definition speak to this 
point, as do the drafters’ concerns about opening the floodgates to all those fleeing violence 
in search of safety.127 Instead, States chose to delimit refugee status in the ways outlined in 
Chapter 2.  
The existence of armed conflict in a refugee claimant’s country of origin has histori-
cally presented a challenge to decision-makers tasked with the application of the Conven-
tion refugee definition.128 The proper approach to such claims is the subject of jurisdiction-
al discord and yet the topic has received surprisingly little jurisprudential attention.  
According to the UNHCR Handbook, “[p]ersons compelled to leave their country of 
origin as a result of international or national armed conflicts are not normally considered 
refugees under the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol.”129 This general rule is tempered by 
the following statement: 
However, foreign invasion or occupation of all or part of a country can result – 
and occasionally has resulted – in persecution for one or more of the reasons 
enumerated in the 1951 Convention. In such cases, refugee status will depend 
upon whether the applicant is able to show that he has a “well-founded fear of 
being persecuted” in the occupied territory and, in addition, upon whether or 
not he is able to avail himself of the protection of his government.130 
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Holzer notes that this position reflects the dominant view in scholarship and comports with 
State practice.131 Storey and Wallace refer to this position as the ‘exceptionality approach,’ 
meaning that the Convention does not apply to persons fleeing armed conflict save for spe-
cial circumstances or exceptions.132 Thus, a refugee claimant escaping conflict or war in 
her home country who cannot link her fear to a Convention ground must rely on “extracon-
ventional protection against refoulement.”133  
It should be noted that there is no attempt in this thesis to suggest this position is in-
correct. The validity of this interpretation is affirmed not only by its widespread acceptance 
but also by the deliberate efforts of the OAU and Latin American countries to extend refu-
gee protection to those cut off from Convention protection because of this precise limita-
tion.134 Before considering the Canadian approach to such refugee claims, a few words 
must be said about the terms used by decision-makers to describe war and conflict scenari-
os.  
As Holzer points out, decision-makers employ a variety of descriptors to denote vi-
olence in a claimant’s home country, including armed conflict, civil war, unrest and wide-
spread violence.135 As well, the use of ‘generalized violence’ to distinguish between claim-
ants facing untargeted violence and those facing persecution for reasons of a Convention 
ground is common throughout the jurisprudence.136 Where this thesis employs these terms 
to describe conflict in a claimant’s home country, it does so to denote a situation of vio-
lence rising to the level of ‘armed conflict’ under IHL. This is an important point because 
the term ‘armed conflict’ has a distinct legal meaning under IHL, as it is the presence of 
armed conflict that triggers the application of humanitarian regime. The precise meaning of 
‘armed conflict’ is taken up in Chapter 4. 
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3.1.  The  Canadian  Approach  
In the Canadian context, a handful of cases in the early 1990s addressed the question of 
how decision-makers ought to approach refugee claims from those fleeing armed conflict 
or other situations of violence. The earliest and most significant of these cases was Salibian 
v. Canada, which was decided by the Federal Court of Appeal in 1990.137  
 Salibian was a Lebanese citizen of Armenian descent and Christian faith. He 
brought a claim for refugee status on the basis of a series of persecutory incidents that oc-
curred while his home country was mired in civil war. He argued that the incidents were 
due to his nationality and religion, but the RPD rejected his application on the grounds that 
the persecution he faced was not “directed against him in particular.”138 The conflict in 
Lebanon, it was held, was a disruptive force in the lives of all Lebanese citizens and 
Salibian was no more a victim than anyone else.  
The Federal Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the RPD had “misunderstood the 
nature of the burden the applicant had to meet.”139 The RPD had zeroed in on the issue of 
whether the persecution was ‘personal’ – as in, individual to Salibian – and neglected evi-
dence about the treatment of Armenian Christians in Lebanon writ large. The Court made 
the following pronouncement regarding claims from persons fleeing countries in conflict: 
[A] situation of civil war in a given country is not an obstacle to a claim pro-
vided the fear felt is not that felt indiscriminately by all citizens as a conse-
quence of the civil war, but that felt by the applicant himself, by a group with 
which he is associated, or, even, by all citizens on account of a risk of persecu-
tion based on one of the reasons stated in the definition.140 
The Court also adopted Hathaway’s words:  
[T]he best evidence that an individual faces a serious chance of persecution is 
usually treatment afforded similarly situated persons in the country of origin. In 
the context of claims derived from situations of generalized oppression, there-
fore, the issue is not whether the claimant is more at risk than anyone else in 
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her country, but rather whether the broadly based harassment or abuse is suffi-
ciently serious to substantiate a claim to refugee status.141 
The approach taken by the Court in Salibian is referred to as the non-comparative approach 
and was affirmed in the subsequent case of Rizkallah in 1992 wherein the Court stated that 
a refugee “must be targeted for persecution in some way, either personally or collective-
ly.”142  
In the 1995 Isa ruling, however, the Federal Court took a different course.143 Isa 
was a Somali claimant and member of the Marehan sub-clan of the Darod tribe. Fleeing the 
clan-based civil war in his home country, Isa applied for refugee status in Canada on the 
basis of his membership in a particular social group. The IRB rejected his status claim on 
the grounds that neither he nor his clan was targeted more than any other person or clan in 
Somalia. In its review of the decision, the Court stated, “[m]any, if not most civil war situa-
tions are racially or ethnically based. If racially motivated attacks in civil war circumstanc-
es constitute a ground for convention refugee status, then, all individuals on either side of 
the conflict will qualify.”144 The Court then upheld the IRB’s decision, which found that 
“all clans and sub-clans are both perpetrators and victims and that the claimant’s clan is not 
differentially targeted.”145 
The Court in the Isa case followed the comparative or ‘differential-risk’ approach to 
the applicant’s case. According to this view, a decision-maker must consider “the predica-
ment faced by the claimant, or her group, as compared with the circumstances of other per-
sons in her country of origin who face harm from the same or other agents of persecu-
tion.”146 By contrast, the non-comparative approach in the Salibian case did not focus on 
the claimant’s risk compared to others but “whether the claimant’s risk is a risk of suffi-
ciently serious harm and is linked to a Convention reason.”147 
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The schism between these cases and ongoing confusion about this matter prompted 
the IRB to issue Chairperson Guideline 1: Civilian Non-Combatants Fearing Persecution in 
Civil War Situations in 1996. The Guidelines advocate the use of the non-comparative ap-
proach and provide decision-makers with a framework by which to conduct this analysis.  
 The Guidelines identify three general categories of claims that arise in the civil war 
context and have the potential to satisfy the Convention refugee definition. First, there are 
the claims based on a fear of persecution in a generalized civil war. These claims may in-
volve either an individual or a group facing a harm that is distinguishable from the general 
risk of civil conflict. Examples offered in the Guidelines include claims from those who, 
for reasons of political conscience, refuse to participate in the hostilities and are subjected 
to persecution on this basis or claims from women uniquely targeted due to their gender. 
Second, there are the claims based on a fear of persecution in a civil war context when the 
persecution is directed against a particular group and the claimant is affiliated with said 
group. One example is a claimant who is part of a racial group targeted for ethnic cleans-
ing. Third, there are the claims arising in the context of a civil war but which have no con-
nection to the war itself. In this latter case, “the claim should be determined without refer-
ence to the civil war framework.”148 
Importantly, while the 1996 Guidelines refer to the international humanitarian law 
instruments that may assist decision-makers in assessing these claims, Holzer observes that 
there are no references to IHL norms in any recent decision.149  
Chapter  4  
IHL  as  Lex  Specialis  and  Refugee  Claims  in  Canada    
The 1996 Guidelines on Civilian Non-Combatants Fearing Persecution in Civil War Situa-
tions represent the only major statement in the Canadian refugee system on the proper ap-
proach to refugee claims arising in the context of armed conflict. Apart from the Salibian 
case and the subsequent decisions briefly regurgitating its holding, there is little judicial 
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interrogation of this issue. Given recent developments in international law and the ongoing 
concern about the protection of those fleeing armed conflict, a re-examination of the 
Guidelines is warranted.  
Having discussed the nature of the principle lex specialis, the core elements of the 
Convention refugee definition and the approach to civilian non-combatants fleeing armed 
conflict, this thesis now turns to the question asked at its outset. This Chapter considers the 
limitations on the use of IHL as lex specialis in the refugee status determination process 
before turning to the question of how IHL norms may offer interpretive guidance to deci-
sion-makers conducting an inclusion analysis.  
4.1   Limitations  on  the  use  of  IHL  as  lex  specialis  in  Refugee  Status  
Determination  
This thesis identifies two primary limitations on the use of IHL as lex specialis in refugee 
status determination. First, lex specialis is but one principle of treaty interpretation in inter-
national law. The maxim is thus limited by the operation of more authoritative principles. 
Specifically, lex specialis is limited by the requirement that the terms of a treaty be inter-
preted in good faith in light of the object and purpose. Second, the use of IHL as lex spe-
cialis is limited to refugee status claims arising in ‘armed conflict’ as defined in humanitar-
ian law.  
Limited  by  more  authoritative  interpretive  principles  
As discussed in Chapter 1, lex specialis is a widely-accepted principle of interpretation in 
domestic and international law. In the relationship between IHRL and IHL, lex specialis 
permits decision-makers to reach for more specialized norms in order to analyze legal ques-
tions with greater precision. It is, however, a relatively weak rule as it operates between 
these two regimes, offering interpretive guidance only where appropriate.  
 Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codify the rules of 
customary international law with respect to treaty interpretation. Within this scheme, lex 
specialis falls under Article 31(3)(c) as one of the “relevant rules of international law ap-
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plicable between the parties.”150 Although treaty interpretation is a highly contextual pro-
cess, the VCLT establishes a certain hierarchy among the sources of interpretation. Before 
considering Article 31(3)(c), an interpreter “must first consider the plain meaning of the 
words in a treaty, if any, proceeding therefrom to the context and to considerations relating 
to object and purpose, subsequent practice and, eventually, travaux preparatoires.”151 Lex 
specialis is thus subordinate to these other sources in the interpretive process. 
In light of the above discussion, one may deduce that where IHL as lex specialis 
contradicts the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention, its use is impermissible under 
international law.152 As per the VCLT, a treaty’s object and purpose is gleaned from the 
text, preamble and annexes.153 Hathaway makes an important addition to this point, arguing 
that “the obligation to interpret the text of a treaty in the light of its object and purpose 
should be conceived as incorporating the overarching duty to interpret a treaty in a way that 
ensures its effectiveness.”154 In the case of the 1951 Convention, the preamble’s invocation 
of human rights instruments and reference to the “widest possible exercise 
of…fundamental rights and freedoms”155 speaks to a humanitarian impetus intent on safe-
guarding the rights of those who fall within the protective scope of the treaty. Thus, where 
the lex specialis principle narrows the scope of protection156 or, as per Hathaway’s point, 
limits the effectiveness of the Convention, it is inconsistent with the customary rules of 
treaty interpretation.  
Importantly, however, this does not mean that IHL is only properly drawn upon 
when it supports a claim for refugee status. Rather, where an IHL norm extends less protec-
tion to a civilian or combatant than the IHRL rule governing the same situation for the in-
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dividual, it is improper to use the former to contextualize the latter as to do so would re-
duce the protective scope of the Convention and thus contradict the object and purpose of 
the treaty.157  
Storey observes that whether IHRL or IHL provides the more protective norm de-
pends on the circumstances.158 An interesting example highlighted by Storey and expound-
ed upon by Milanovic159 is the case of detention. Under human rights law, Article 9(1) of 
the ICCPR provides 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are estab-
lished by law.160 
By contrast, IHL permits the detention of a civilian non-combatant under the Fourth Gene-
va Convention “if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”161 A 
refugee decision-maker faced with the question of whether a civilian claimant’s detention 
during armed conflict constitutes persecution may be inclined to reach for the IHL norm 
given the context. However, it is the contention of this thesis that to do so would be im-
proper because the IHL norm provides less protection to the civilian than its IHRL equiva-
lent.162 It is thus crucial for decision-makers to consider whether the more specialized rule 
– the IHL norm – is more or less protective than the IHRL rule it aims to inform.  
Limited  to  Situations  of  Armed  Conflict    
International humanitarian law applies to situations of armed conflict and is the lex special-
is of IHRL in this context. In order for decision-makers to properly draw upon IHL as an 
interpretive aid in a refugee status determination, the situation in the claimant’s country of 
                                                
 
157 Id. Holzer argues this is the case with persecution, but this thesis takes a different approach to this ques-
tion.  
158 Hugo Storey, Armed Conflict in Asylum Law: The “War-Flaw,” 31 Ref. Survey Quarterly (2012) 17-18. 
159 Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and Human Rights Law, in Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (Orna Ben-Naftali, ed., 2011) 113-114. 
160 ICCPR, supra note 7 at Article 9(1). 
161 GC IV, supra note 10 at Article 42.  
162 On this point, this thesis also maintains that the example in the Nuclear Weapons case would also not 
comport with the Convention’s object and purpose.  
 35 
origin or nationality must meet this definition. The use of IHL as lex specialis is thus lim-
ited to situations of violence that come within the meaning of ‘armed conflict’ under IHL. 
Historically, international humanitarian law regulated only wars between states, 
viewing internal civil conflict as a purely domestic matter of little concern to the interna-
tional community. With the adoption of the Geneva Conventions in 1949, however, IHL 
embraced two distinct legal classifications of armed conflict: international armed conflict 
(IAC) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC). Common Article 2 applies in situa-
tions of the former, construed in the 1949 Conventions as “all cases of declared war or of 
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties.”163 Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I in 1977 expanded the legal definition of 
IAC to include conflicts where “peoples are fighting against colonial domination, alien 
occupation or racist regimes.”164 
The notion that conflicts not of an international character ought to be subject to in-
ternational law was an unsurprisingly contested proposition during the diplomatic confer-
ences preceding the Geneva Conventions.165 As Jean Pictet noted in his influential Com-
mentary, however, the humanitarian principle driving the protection of the sick and wound-
ed in IAC “could not fail to lead to the idea of applying the principle to all cases of armed 
conflicts, including those of an internal character.”166 Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II comprise the core IHL provisions applicable to 
NIAC, although the latter requires a much higher threshold of violence, control and organi-
zation on the part of non-state belligerents in order to trigger its application.  
While the core IHL instruments distinguish between IAC and NIAC, they do not 
provide an authoritative definition of ‘armed conflict.’ The case law of the International 
Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) however, has been especially illustra-
tive in this regard. In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber declared an armed conflict exists 
“whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
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between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State.”167 This statement is of critical importance to IHL, as the existence of NIAC 
has been historically difficult to adduce. The two elements ‘protracted armed violence’ and 
‘organization’ help determine when a situation surpasses that of an internal disturbance to 
one of NIAC, thereby triggering the application of humanitarian law. Later in Haradinaj, 
the Trial Chamber examined the ICTY treatment of ‘protracted armed violence’ and found 
that this phrase denoted the ‘intensity’ of a conflict situation, which is determined by refer-
ence to the following criteria: 
[T]he number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of 
weapons and other military equipment used; the number and calibre of muni-
tions fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting, 
the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the number of 
civilians fleeing combat zones.168 
As well, the Trial Chamber posited that the “involvement of the UN Security Council may 
also be a reflection of the intensity of a conflict.”169 With respect to the second element, the 
non-state armed groups involved in a conflict must attain a certain level of organization 
before the violence qualifies as NIAC. One determines organization by examining whether 
the group has a command structure, headquarters, control over territory, access to military 
equipment, coordination and capacity to negotiate agreements, among other factors.170 
 Many scholars question the rigid distinction between IAC and NIAC in humanitari-
an law. Kolb and Hyde, for instance, point to new instruments that apply to armed conflict 
regardless of its classification as evidence that the significance of the IAC-NIAC dichoto-
my may be waning.171 This thinking mirrors developments in social science. In her influen-
tial work New and Old Wars, for instance, Kaldor argues that conflicts once characterized 
as civil, internal and ‘low-intensity’ now have an increasing number of transnational con-
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nections.172 These ‘new wars’ “involve a blurring of the distinctions between 
war…organized crime….and large-scale violations of human rights.”173 While IHL today 
retains the two traditional legal classifications of armed conflict, most of the crucial protec-
tions apply to both situations, such as the rules governing protected persons and means and 
methods of warfare.174 
 The humanitarian law notion of armed conflict is not foreign to the refugee status 
determination process. When applying the exclusion clause contained in Article 1F(A) of 
the 1951 Convention, for instance, decision-makers must determine whether the claimant 
has committed a crime against peace, war crime or crime against humanity—acts which are 
“intrinsically linked to armed conflict.”175 Nevertheless, as Holzer argues, engagement with 
this IHL concept is troublesome in the refugee context for a few reasons. First, those con-
ducting a refugee status determination do not have the authority to adduce whether a situa-
tion of violence constitutes an armed conflict as they do not possess the legal competence 
to directly apply IHL. Second, decision-makers are required to look to the future to consid-
er the potential fate of the claimant upon return, whereas the question of whether or not an 
armed conflict exists is a matter of fact in the present. Third, inquiring about the presence 
of armed conflict may distract decision-makers from the crux of the claim and place an 
exaggerated emphasis on the conditions in the country of origin or nationality.  
 In light of these difficulties, national decision-makers attempting to distinguish 
armed conflict from other situations of violence in the claimant’s country of origin must 
proceed with caution. In particular, decision-makers should rely on the legal classifications 
of the ICRC and/or the UN Security Council as to the existence of armed conflict, as the 
opinions of these organizations are authoritative in this regard. Decision-makers must 
properly situate this information as background material intended to inform the overall ref-
ugee status determination and not unduly focus on whether or not an armed conflict is pre-
sent. Importantly, because most situations of armed conflict in a claimant’s country of 
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origin will be NIAC, decision-makers drawing upon IHL as lex specialis must ensure to 
refer to the appropriate body of rules. 
4.2   Inclusion  and  IHL  as  lex  specialis  in  Refugee  Status  Determination  
This thesis considers how IHL as the lex specialis of IHRL offers interpretive guidance to 
national decision-makers when analyzing the claims of civilian non-combatants fleeing 
armed conflict. As discussed in Chapter 2, Canadian decision-makers examine refugee in-
clusion through a human rights lens, thereby centering refugee status determination around 
the relationship between the individual and the State. This approach finds broad support in 
international law today.  
The inquiry underlying this final section is perhaps best articulated by Cantor as a 
question of how the “context-influenced obligations of HRL change as a result of the ap-
plicability of IHL in the country of origin.”176 As discussed earlier in this Chapter, national 
decision-makers cannot draw upon IHL norms in order to narrow the scope of protection 
under the 1951 Convention. However, there are ways the inclusion analysis benefits from 
reference to the humanitarian law regime. This thesis advances two main arguments on this 
point. First, reference to IHL norms may assist national decision-makers in distinguishing 
between general consequences of war and persecution on the basis of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. Second, drawing upon 
IHL may help national decision-makers to properly contextualize the standards for evaluat-
ing the claimant’s well-founded fear, availability of state protection and possibility of an 
IFA.   
Persecution  for  Reasons  of  a  Convention  Ground  
The Salibian holding and its subsequent endorsement by the 1996 Guidelines firmly estab-
lishes the non-comparative approach as the preferred method of refugee status determina-
tion when the crux of the claim relates to the presence of armed conflict in the claimant’s 
home country. According to this approach, a civilian non-combatant fleeing armed conflict 
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is a refugee if she fears persecution for reasons of a Convention ground, either personally 
or collectively,177 and cannot avail herself of state protection or relocate to an IFA. She is 
not required to demonstrate that she or her group is especially targeted compared to others, 
but that the harm she fears constitutes persecution and has a nexus to one or more of the 
five grounds.  
The schism between the non-comparative and differential risk approaches indicates 
that the most challenging aspect of the inclusion analysis for these claims is distinguishing 
between generalized violence and persecution for reasons of a Convention ground. As 
Holzer argues, this distinction often eclipses the fact that violence is sometimes both wide-
spread and targeted.178 The Court recognized as much in Salibian when it noted that protec-
tion could theoretically extend to all citizens so long as they face a risk of persecution 
based on one of the established grounds.179  
International humanitarian law delineates permissible from impermissible conduct 
during armed conflict. Non-compliance with IHL is an unfortunately common feature of 
warfare,180  particularly in NIAC where high civilian death tolls and crushing brutality are 
the norm. The regime lacks an effective enforcement mechanism and thus compliance pos-
es a major challenge. However, IHL establishes a hierarchy among norms, viewing certain 
violations as graver than others. This framework helps distinguish generalized violence 
from persecution under the Convention as serious IHL violations indicate that the claimant 
may be facing something beyond “common victimization.”181 
The phrase “serious violations of IHL” refers to conduct that either endangers pro-
tected persons or objects or breaches important values.182 Such violations constitute war 
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crimes as per customary international humanitarian law, which applies to both IAC and 
NIAC. A civilian non-combatant who fears death as a result of an armed conflict in her 
home country may have her claim dismissed on an assumption that civilian deaths are a 
general consequence of war. If one examines the IHL rules in conjunction with country of 
origin information, however, a different result may emerge. Belligerents in an armed con-
flict are bound by the principle of distinction, which requires differentiation between civil-
ians and combatants as well as between civilian and military objects.183 The deliberate tar-
geting of civilians is prohibited under IHL. An attack against combatants or military ob-
jects which incidentally entails a loss of civilian life conforms with international humani-
tarian law so long as the loss is not excessive when compared with the military advantage 
gained.184 Civilian death in this context is perhaps appropriately characterized as general-
ized violence. If, however, the conflict is marked by attacks on civilian populations and/or 
other serious violations of IHL, civilian deaths are better understood as targeted violence.  
 One notable characteristic of NIAC that is undoubtedly relevant to the present anal-
ysis is the fact that conflicts of this nature are typically based around racial, ethnic, political 
and/or religious rivalries. In these contexts, closer scrutiny of ‘generalized violence’ is war-
ranted because violence against civilians is less likely to be random and indiscriminate than 
in conflicts without these dividing lines. Where the country evidence indicates that the con-
flict in question has a racial, ethnic, religious and/or political basis, national decision-
makers must carefully consider the mindset of belligerents before determining that the 
claimant’s fear is of a general consequence of war. Reference to IHL norms may assist na-
tional decision-makers with this task. Serious violations of IHL entail individual criminal 
responsibility under international law and thus carry a mens rea component, which is typi-
cally ‘intent.’185 As Storey and Wallace astutely point out, where serious IHL violations 
                                                
 
183 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I 
(2005) at Part 1 [hereinafter ICRC, CIHL Vol. 1]. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. See Rule 156 in Volume I and Volume II. 
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occur in the context of a conflict that “is racially, ethnically or politically based, then intent 
must surely be based on a protected ground.”186 
In many cases, a pure human rights approach may be limited in its ability to distin-
guish between generalized violence and that which is targeted on the basis of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion and/or membership in a particular social group. Instances of 
civilian death, rape, arbitrary arrest and detention, for instance, may appear as random acts 
of indiscriminate violence without a nexus to a Convention ground but in truth are part of a 
widespread pattern of targeted violence occurring in the context of a racially, ethnically, 
religiously and/or politically-based war. IHL informs this assessment first and foremost by 
providing a framework in which certain norm violations are considered especially grave. 
When these violations feature in an armed conflict, their presence is an indication that the 
conflict falls outside IHL parameters, thereby warranting a closer assessment of the vio-
lence the claimant fears. From here, country information speaking to the bases of the con-
flict read in conjunction with IHL norms may help decision-makers avoid the erroneous 
conclusion that violence is not persecution with a nexus to a protected ground simply be-
cause it is targeted towards large groups of people. 
Well-­Founded  Fear,  State  Protection  and  Internal  Flight  Alternative  
Refugee status determination in the Canadian context proceeds according to a human rights 
framework. Chapter 2 outlined the Canadian standards for assessing each of the core ele-
ments of the Convention refugee definition. National decision-makers determine whether 
the claimant’s fear is well-founded by examining whether she objectively faces a reasona-
ble possibility of persecution. Canadian law presumes the State is capable of protecting its 
citizens unless there is a complete State breakdown or the claimant is able to demonstrate 
by way of clear and convincing evidence that protection would not be forthcoming. The 
onus is on the State – the IRB in most cases – to raise the possibility of a specific IFA 
which is reasonable for the claimant in all circumstances.  
                                                
 
186 Storey & Wallace, supra note 132 at 363. 
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Each of these standards is informed by IHRL, which is predominantly a peacetime 
regime. Because they are construed through the lens of peace, they presume the absence of 
large-scale violence and instability in the claimant’s home country. They are, however, 
fairly open-ended, contextual standards and thus may look secondarily to IHL as lex spe-
cialis for guidance.  
When the violence in the claimant’s country of origin falls within the IHL meaning 
of ‘armed conflict,’ the situation by definition involves ‘protracted armed violence’ either 
between the State and non-state actors or between different non-state groups.187 The vio-
lence must meet a certain threshold of intensity in order to qualify as an NIAC to which 
IHL applies.188 These conditions and the framework regulating them may help contextual-
ize the aforementioned legal standards when analyzing the claim of a civilian non-
combatant.   
When the crux of a refugee status claim links to an NIAC in the country of origin, 
evidence of belligerent compliance or non-compliance with relevant IHL norms may pro-
vide assistance in determining whether the claimant faces a reasonable or more-than-
minimal possibility of persecution. For instance, IHL regulates the means and methods of 
warfare with a high degree of specificity. In particular, the regime provides a detailed list of 
prohibited weapons and restrictions on the use of several others.189 In the context of a refu-
gee status determination, evidence that a belligerent identified by the claimant as a persecu-
tor or potential persecutor uses weapons causing superfluous injury, for example, may 
make the possibility of persecution more likely than not. Therefore, national decision-
makers may draw upon these norms and the language of IHL to inform the objective basis 
of the claimant’s fear.  
The burden of demonstrating either a complete State breakdown or clear and con-
vincing evidence of a lack of protection is a high one for civilian non-combatants seeking 
refugee status in Canada. Many armed conflicts involve the State retaining control over 
some or most of the territory and thus avoid the type of total breakdown in cases like So-
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malia. However, the ‘clear and convincing’ standard may be difficult to establish without 
reference to an IHL framework, particularly, as Storey and Wallace argue,190 when the 
claimant is associated with the losing side of a war. They write, 
[S]ituations in which one side has decisively gained the upper hand are precise-
ly the type of context that often experiences the gravest violations of IHL 
norms…One-sided conflicts may give rise to one-sided protection. Certainly, if 
the winning side is violating international humanitarian law on a major scale, 
this feature should be enough on its own to demonstrate a lack of effective pro-
tection.191  
From the IHRL perspective, States are presumed capable of protecting their citizens and to 
afford such protection on an equal basis. In the context of war, however, particularly where 
the dividing lines are racial, ethnic, religious and/or political, this presumption is unlikely 
to hold true. Reference to IHL in this context may soften the clear and convincing standard 
to better reflect the reality of the conflict in question, particularly as it affects certain seg-
ments of the population. This approach accords with Canadian jurisprudence, which has 
repeatedly emphasized that the availability of State protection is a highly contextual as-
sessment and must not place an impossible burden on the claimant.192  
The possibility of an internal flight alternative may be significantly constrained by 
the presence of an armed conflict in the claimant’s home country. In considering whether a 
proposed IFA is reasonable, national-decision makers must examine a range of factors, 
including the presence of violence. Serious IHL violations and/or fighting in general will 
likely make the IFA an unreasonable option for the claimant and drawing upon IHL may 
assist in reaching this conclusion.  
Conclusion  
The overarching purpose of this thesis was to consider the relevance of international hu-
manitarian law as lex specialis to the interpretation of the refugee definition contained in 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention. The thesis explored this question in the particular 
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context of Canada, where refugee decision-makers analyze the claims of civilians fleeing 
armed conflict using the non-comparative approach.  
 Chapter 1 considered the regime interactions between IRL, IHRL and IHL in inter-
national law. Chapter 2 discussed the definition of a Convention refugee and its elemental 
characteristics through the lens of Canadian jurisprudence. Chapter 3 explained the varying 
approaches to civilian non-combatants in refugee law jurisprudence, with a focus on this 
discord in Canadian law. Finally, Chapter 4 considered how IHL as the lex specialis to 
IHRL provides interpretive guidance to national decision-makers and when reference to 
IHL would be appropriate under domestic and international law.  
This thesis draws three broad conclusions on this question. First, where the use of 
lex specialis as an interpretive principle narrows the scope of refugee protection under the 
1951 Convention, such use does not comply with international law. Second, the use of IHL 
as an interpretive tool is appropriate where the situation of violence in a claimant’s country 
of origin is an armed conflict to which IHL applies. Third, national decision-makers may 
draw upon the IHL framework to interpret the core elements of the refugee definition when 
analyzing the claims of civilian non-combatants fleeing armed conflict. However, reference 
to IHL norms is most useful where the country information indicates pervasive non-
compliance with the law of armed conflict and/or serious violations of IHL, and where the 
conflict is marked by racial, ethnic, religious and/or political tensions. Furthermore, IHL as 
lex specialis is a crucial interpretive tool to help decision-makers distinguish between the 
general consequences of war and persecution for reasons of a Convention ground. IHL 
norms may also bring greater precision to legal standards typically construed through a 
human rights lens.  
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